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Special Section on Cognitive Studies, Theatre, and 
Performance
Rhonda Blair and John Lutterbie
For over a decade theatre and performance scholars and practitioners have 
been exploring how current research in the cognitive and neurosciences can 
illuminate understanding and advance our various disciplines. Cognitive sciences 
began surfacing in theatre and performance studies in the late 1990s. By 2001, 
papers were being presented at American Society for Theatre Research (ASTR) 
seminars and articles were appearing in theatre journals and scholarly collections 
(e.g., Blair’s “The Method and the Computational Theory of Mind” in David 
Krasner’s Method Acting Reconsidered—an essay she now finds problematic).1 
By 2004 there were working groups at both ASTR and the Performance Studies 
Focus Group preconference of the Association for Theatre in Higher Education 
(ATHE). The first survey book on the subject, Performance and Cognition: Theatre 
Studies and the Cognitive Turn, edited by Bruce McConachie and F. Elizabeth 
Hart, appeared in 2006.2 David Saltz edited a special issue of Theatre Journal on 
“Performance and Cognition” in late 2007.3 In 2008 the first full-length monographs 
were published: McConachie’s Engaging Audiences: A Cognitive Approach to 
Spectating in the Theatre and Blair’s The Actor, Image, and Action: Acting and 
Cognitive Neuroscience.4 Palgrave initiated a new series entitled Cognitive Studies 
in Literature and Performance, under the editorial leadership of McConachie and 
Blakey Vermeule. A representative sample of recent books includes Amy Cook’s 
Shakespearean Neuroplay: Reinvigorating the Study of Dramatic Texts and 
Performance through Cognitive Science (2010) and Lutterbie’s Toward a General 
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Theory of Acting: Cognitive Science and Performance (2011).5
Because the cognitive sciences deal with fundamental aspects of human 
existence and experience, we believe they can be a useful, even necessary part of 
the foundation for work in theatre and performance studies. The sciences provide 
new ways of perceiving the interrelationship of mind and body, new definitions 
of fundamental categories such as emotion, feeling, and action, and, perhaps 
more fundamentally, new definitions of “self” and “other.” The findings of these 
sciences place us on the cusp of a paradigm shift. This does not call for us to reject 
other approaches to theatre and performance studies, but rather it supplements and 
deepens other methodologies used by our fields, while providing new tools and 
perspectives. We approach this project with care, mindful of the ease with which 
research in different fields can be opportunistically misappropriated by those 
not expert in a given discipline, and mindful of the disagreements and variations 
among those who are expert, as they tease out and argue about the implications 
of their findings. 
These sciences can support and enrich our appreciation of a whole range of 
existing performance and theatre theories. Research in neural simulation systems 
provides evidence of the organic basis for the power of imitation, first argued by 
Plato and Aristotle. Research in the neural bases of imagination describes a material 
link between imagination and doing, in ways that both extend and subvert the ideas 
behind Diderot’s model ideal and Stanislavsky’s argument for the power of the 
“magic if.” Cognitive linguistics, particularly in terms of blending and compression, 
takes the meaning of the term “close reading” of dramatic texts to a profound level 
that allows us to see how texts come from and work through our bodies. Dynamic 
Systems Theory allows for a model of embodiment that resists the mind/body duality 
and insists on the interdependency of the individual and the world, while providing 
insights into the tension between the creative impulse and resistance to change.6 The 
science provides insight into the various aspects of ourselves—intellect, emotion, 
body—as part of a complex process we call a person, and how we as organisms 
are inextricably intertwined with each other and our environments.
The umbrella term “cognitive science” encompasses specializations including 
cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, neuroscience, neurolinguistics, and 
cognitive anthropology, among many others. It is possible to follow two primary 
paths of development: neuroscience and psychology. Neuroscience’s beginnings 
can be traced to Paul Broca’s 1861 discovery of the link between a particular brain 
area and the capacity for speech. A key event in the founding of psychology as a 
modern discipline was Wilhelm Wundt’s opening of an experimental psychology 
laboratory in 1879, an innovation that marked a clear separation of psychology from 
philosophy. Sigmund Freud, who began as a research psychologist, left this work 
to develop psychoanalysis, publishing The Interpretation of Dreams in 1900. His 
vocabulary of the unconscious would dominate views of the psyche for decades in 
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the US. Shortly thereafter, in 1906, Ivan Pavlov published his findings about reflex 
responses; his work and that of others, such as Ivan Sechenov, laid the ground for 
behavioral approaches to psychology that would rival psychoanalytic ones.
Other fields exerted a significant influence on cognitive science at its inception 
in the mid-twentieth century. Linguistics, established as a discipline in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, focused on the work of semioticians Ferdinand de 
Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce; and, beginning in 1914, Viktor Shklovsky 
and other Russian literary critics developed a technical approach to the study of 
poetic language known as formalism. These laid the groundwork for structuralism, a 
term coined in 1929 by linguist Roman Jakobson, which was to become a basis for 
the study of language. Computer science (the first freely programmable computer 
was invented in 1936) and advances in the sophistication and speed with which 
computers process data led computer scientists to hypothesize that the binary 
language of computer processes was analogous to the functioning of the human 
brain. These provided the basis, in the latter half of the 1950s, on which a group of 
computer scientists interested in artificial intelligence, psychologists, philosophers, 
and linguists—most prominently, Noam Chomsky—founded the field of cognitive 
science to study the acquisition and processing of knowledge that argued against, 
among other things, the reductive materialism of B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism. 
This first generation cognitive science (roughly the 1950s to the 1980s) developed 
theories of mind that tended to marginalize physical aspects of how the brain works. 
This was to become the purview of neuroscience.
At approximately the same time, neuroscientists were identifying physical 
sources of cognition, discovering more locations in the brain for select functions, 
learning how, in some cases, brain anatomy could be altered by experience (e.g., 
the size of string musicians’ cortices devoted to the hands is larger than that of 
nonmusicians), and defining some mechanics of memory function.7 By 1970 these 
neuroscientists had discovered the neurological basis of memory, marked by an 
alteration in neural structure. By the end of the 1970s, positron emission tomography 
(PET scans) allowed us to take pictures of activity in the brain. The invention of 
functional magnetic resonance imagery (fMRI) in 1990 provided images of dynamic 
neural processes. With the advent of these new technologies, the stunning images, 
and the promise of scientific and medical advances, neuroscience was thrust center 
stage. This, along with the human genome project initiated in 1990 and growing 
interest in Artificial Intelligence—made possible by the increased speed and 
versatility of computers utilizing parallel processors—gave rise to public interest 
in the brain. Early arguments that cognitive processes could be explained by the 
binary codes of computer programs caused a rift between brain researchers who 
supported this computational model and those who were discovering that neural 
operations are more complex than can be accounted for by on/off switches.
Perhaps to resist the early and simplistic visions set forth by the prophets 
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of computer science, or the science-fiction seductions of William Gibson’s 
Neuromancer, where subjectivity can be downloaded in cyberspace, neuroscientists 
led by Antonio Damasio began to draw together different scientific findings to 
form a more complex image of cognition that insisted on the brain as inextricably 
linked to the body and responsive to the environment.8 Speculative texts began 
to proliferate that encouraged interdisciplinary research, liberating neuroscience 
from the laboratory, and ushering in what might be called the second generation 
of cognitive science. This second phase is attempting to identify, among other 
things, how consciousness arises and its relationship to language, emotion, and our 
interactions with the world, as an embodied process. Linguist George Lakoff and 
philosopher Mark Johnson argue that our sense of our bodies, indeed, the fact of 
being a body, is the source for our major metaphors of thought, meaning, and values, 
such that, “Much of conceptual inference is, therefore, sensorimotor inference.”9 
Cognitive scientists and linguists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner hold a 
perspective similar to that of Lakoff and Johnson, particularly in the prominence 
they give to metaphor and image.10 Their network model of conceptual integration 
holds that imagination is the central engine of meaning and that metaphor is central 
to cognition. They describe how different mental spaces—small conceptual packets, 
or images, constructed as we think and talk—are integrated in novel ways to help 
us negotiate our lives. Disparate “inputs” are combined to create new knowledge, 
insight, or experience that goes beyond that contained in the initial inputs, creating 
a blended conceptual space. Though blending can be conscious on one level, it 
operates largely unconsciously; we are not precisely aware of how the blending 
happens. The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys in 1996 energized research 
in neural simulation systems in humans, and generated still more questions about 
the nature of the self, imitation, empathy, and action.
Though we do not know all of the steps by which “matter becomes 
imagination” (to use a phrase from neuroscientists Gerald Edelman and Giulio 
Tononi), how elements of consciousness and behavior relate to brain function 
is becoming clearer.11 Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio comes at the problem of 
consciousness through his somatic marker hypothesis, “somatic marker” being 
a term for describing how body-states become linked with conscious responses 
to or interpretations of them. As with other views cited here, body, feeling, and 
intellect are viewed as aspects of a single, if complex organic process. In this view, 
the brain creates strings of associations that arise in the body first as an emotion 
(here meaning a physiological state of the body), which is translated into a feeling 
(a conscious “registration” of a body state), which leads to behavior that may or 
may not be associated with reason or rational thought. These markers become our 
repertory of responses for guiding reactions to new situations. Particularly pertinent 
is Damasio’s assertion that reason in the fullest sense grows out of and is permeated 
by emotion, and that emotion is consistently affected by reason and conscious 
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cognition. Some neuroscientists theorize that who we are and how we function 
are based largely upon the development of specific neural patterns, or synaptic 
connections. Neuroscientist Elizabeth Wilson describes cognitive processing as 
“the spread of activation across a network of interconnected, neuron-like units,” 
i.e., “Knowledge is implicit, stored in the connections rather than the units,” in 
the paths from neuron to neuron.12 From this perspective our sense of our self is at 
bottom a product of the workings of our synapses, the gaps between our neurons 
that are bridged by chemicals or an electrical impulse. In this model, nature (genetic 
make-up) and nurture (experiences) are merely different ways of doing the same 
thing—wiring synapses in the brain that become manifest as who we are. 
This “ecological” or systemic approach to the development and function of 
cognition is also evident in the work of Edelman and Tononi, who believe that higher 
brain functions, including consciousness, are conditioned by and require interactions 
with the world and other people. That is, mind is a result of reciprocal interaction 
between perceptual and proprioceptive experiences, between external and internal 
environments, such that what happens in one influences what happens in the other. 
They hold that only physical processes are needed to explain consciousness, and 
that consciousness arose only because of a very specific evolution of the physical 
human body in response to environmental changes both in the natural world and 
in the organization of human communities. Rejecting the concept of the closed 
circuits of binary logic as the basis for understanding cognitive processes, embodied 
cognition is viewed as an open, nonlinear system that is subject to perturbations 
from an array of different sources. This project has immense implications for our 
understanding of creativity and the resistance to change, the structure of memory, 
and of consciousness.
That said, current cognitive science dislocates a number of things, among 
them familiar constructs of identity, feeling, and selfhood, and the belief that 
culture and biology are separable—constructs and beliefs that have been dominant 
for decades. We must, at the same time, be cautious about our applications of the 
science and honest about our motives for doing so. Science has long informed our 
engagement with theatre and performance, but there are limits to the relationship 
and caveats about applications of the former to the latter. Scientists use a reductive 
approach—verification through repeatable experimentation that accounts for all 
of the variables involved in the experiment—and an inductive process. In the arts 
and humanities, theorizing (or, more accurately in terms of science’s vocabulary, 
hypothesizing) is typically deductive. It is based upon the examination of texts 
and historical artifacts, the observation of performances, or the assessment of the 
experiential through a particular critical, philosophical, or political framework, and 
often involves a good degree of subjective interpretation. The inductive nature of 
science demands that it be reductive, looking at specific, even microscopic objects 
such as “a single type of neuron in a specific part of the brain.”13 Underpinning 
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the sciences are principles of falsifiability and repeatability. Theories and things 
presented by science as facts are proven by results that are repeatable, experiment 
after experiment, and that are always subject to being disproved when a new 
experiment produces different results. This is, of course, foreign to performance 
studies’ reveling in the complex and contradictory aspects of our objects of 
study. Interestingly, when scientists bring together the results of a broad range of 
experiments to reach general conclusions, this brings more variables into play across 
the experiments and often makes conclusions more speculative, i.e., the broader 
the assertion, the further scientists move into conjecture and hypothesis and away 
from science. For this reason, among others, those of us in performance and theatre 
studies must engage primary and secondary scientific research, which raises the 
challenge of educating ourselves in the terrain of these sciences and the standards 
by which they operate. We have found summary articles in recognized journals to 
be useful points of entry because they provide a context for and condensation of 
research on particular topics, including competing arguments and claims. We must 
engage or, at the very least, acknowledge these competing claims if we are to have 
a hope of being responsible in our appropriations and applications. 
Different kinds of evidence, ranging from the neural to the linguistic and 
behavioral, are useful for different aspects of performance and theatre studies, but 
cannot be applied whole cloth. Those working with this material have been learning, 
among other things, the following: First, one must be cautious in using research on 
the neural level to explain anything in the realm of the experiential or conscious. The 
discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, for example, did not immediately mean 
that humans had mirror neurons or that they functioned identically in humans, or 
that the discovery of neural simulation in humans meant that we are intrinsically 
empathetic. Second, one must be clear about what is presented as scientific theory, 
i.e., an explanation that accounts for observable phenomena, following processes of 
repeatability and falsifiability. This is different than speculations, which are possible 
explanations for phenomena which have not yet been borne out by experimentation. 
It is important to discern between data and conjecture. Third, one must be sensitive 
to contradictions and disagreements among the scientists’ explanations of what they 
have discovered by experimentation and how they are interpreting it. Fourth, one 
must be clear about the differences among the various cognitive science disciplines 
in terms of methodology and parameters for truth claims, e.g., there are differences 
in the processes and perspectives of cognitive linguists and neuroscientists. Finally, 
one must be respectful of the power—conscious or otherwise—of metaphor and the 
intrinsic human tendency to think metaphorically and analogically, or the fact that 
we “live in the blend,” as Amy Cook has written. Sometimes these associational 
leaps are apt, and sometimes not, growing as they do out of experience, habit, and 
desire. Having made this last caveat and acknowledging that the use of science qua 
science can be profoundly important, the use of science as a springboard to engage 
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text, space, and performance can be incredibly rich. This potential for creativity 
and for experiential and intellectual efficacy, however, is different than making a 
claim that what we do has the efficacy or “truth” of science.
We have selected four essays that deploy a range of cognitive disciplines across 
theatre and performance studies. In “For Hecuba or for Hamlet: Rethinking Emotion 
and Empathy in the Theatre,” Amy Cook uses cognitive linguistics, embodied 
cognition studies, and empathy research to engage issues of text and reception, 
and problems of the nature of feeling in the theatre. Using Hamlet’s encounter with 
the Player King as her starting point, Cook teases out the ways that both embodied 
cognition and embedded cognition, as informed by culture, function in the theatrical 
event. The essay unpacks different ways that feeling and empathy work in hearing 
and viewing a performance, particularly in terms of the different loci of engagement 
in generating a response in an audience. Wanda Strukus also engages empathy, but 
does so to explore the nature of audience response to differently-bodied dancers. 
“Mining the Gap: Physically Integrated Performance and Kinesthetic Empathy” 
considers the limits of neural simulation and mirroring systems in explaining 
audience response. Focusing on processes of kinesthetic empathy in audience 
reception, she uses the work of AXIS Dance Company, composed of normative and 
disabled dancers (including those in wheel chairs, those with missing limbs, and 
those with neuromuscular disorders), as a case study for her argument. Through 
engaging issues of conscious cognition, empathy, and kinesthetic response in the 
spectators, Strukus challenges us to rethink our sense of identification with the 
performer, helps us understand how bodily absence or difference works on reception, 
and complicates any easy or automatic appropriation of the idea of mirror neurons 
and neural simulation for performance theory. Pil Hansen presents a case study 
for the application of developmental dramaturgy based on research in memory 
and imagination. “Perceptual Dramaturgy: Swimmer (68)” describes the process 
used to develop the performance named in the title, a solo piece based on the Burt 
Lancaster film. Rethinking dramaturgy through a cognitive lens, Hansen proposes 
that theories of perception and memory enable the dramaturg to understand the 
dynamics of actor/director interaction in rehearsal as a means of understanding 
and suggesting productive categories for artistic choice-making in developing 
the piece. This process also uses an understanding of how the spectator arrives at 
an interpretation to anticipate and, perhaps, mold responses in the performance 
situation. John Emigh draws on the science of neural structures to discuss how a 
mask archetype that appears in many cultures around the world reflects aspects of 
somatosensory brain structure. “Minding Bodies: Demons, Masks, Archetypes, 
and the Limits of Culture” uses findings of cognitive neuroscience to examine the 
archetype of “the demonic or apotropaic (protective) face as encountered in masks 
around the world.” Drawing on examples from various continents, Emigh considers 
how the extreme and exaggerated expressions embodied by these masks reflect 
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“the proportionate neuronal representation accorded parts of the body within the 
somatosensory area of the brain’s neocortex.” In this study of how manifestations 
of performance may be related to neural mapping and sensory receptors, Emigh 
posits that the apotropaic mask reflects the very structure of our brain.
We are honored to have been asked to curate this section for the Journal of 
Dramatic Theory and Criticism. In particular, we appreciate Scott Magelssen’s 
generosity and support throughout the process of working on this project. We 
hope this collection is a productive support and provocation to further work in 
applications of cognitive science to theatre and performance.
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